Got this one from a friend:
From Chet, M.I.T. 1941 graduate, and aeronautical engineer extraordinaire. This was forwarded to him from the former chairman of the M.I.T. Aeronautical Engineering Department. I don't look at Airbus products as completely unsafe, but concur with this assessment, that Airbus has flaws in its design philosophy that degrade its products.
Subject: Airbus vs. Boeing
Interesting article from this old pilot.
Air Bus vs. Boeing
I have had several emails asking my opinion about the Air France crash and before that , the US Airways Hudson River crash.
As most of you know, I have flown the AB330-300 in Intl ops for several thousand hrs as well as , like most of you, multi thousands in Boeings. For the record, my Boeing
is in:707,727 100,200; 737-200,300,400; 747-100,200,SP; 757,767. I also have lots of Douglas (6 types)and Lockheed(2 types), Convair (2 types),Lear(2 types).
With all that, here's what I see through my "caveman" point of view:
Airbus philosophy has left the art of flying and therefore the pilot out of the loop. They train and design the operation so that any low experienced/low skilled person who is good at rote memory (read third world/read and do) pilot can get into this plane and, with enough repetition and rehearsal, fly a normal trip.
FATAL FLAW NO.1- The engines are FADEC (read computer/electronically) controlled and the flight controls are fly by wire/radio signal. THERE IS NO DIRECT CONTROL FROM THE PILOT TO THESE CRITICAL SYSTEMS. Following this spirit/philosophy, the pilot training strictly emphasizes "Always to be in the automated mode." - read auto throttles and auto pilot in all operations even including a single engine failure approach and single engine missed approach!-i.e. AUTO FLT; ALL THE TIME.
Nowhere is there any contingency training or flight manual information data for a pilot to take over manually and fly attitude and power settings for a certain configuration in the event that these auto systems fail. NOR are there any MANUAL direct link controls to the engines/flight controls from the cockpit.
FEDEC is auto control , all the time. If the Hudson River plane had allowed the pilot to override the auto throttles, could the pilots have produced some thrust? In the Boeings, you can "firewall" the engines until they melt or rip off the wing!
In every other plane I have flown in the past 40 years, there is a section in the flight ops manual that relates to this. Mainly it is a table that gives engine thrust settings and aircraft pitch settings for different speeds/configurations in the event that the pilot's airspeed indication in not reliable.- ref: Air France
FATAL FLAW #2- Airbus has incorporated composite materials into critical structural components in order to "one up" the competition with the "BEAN COUNTERS MISSION" of becoming a lighter plane with less fuel burn. Example 1: The AB 330 has no wing spar from the point where the engine mounts to the wing all the way to the wing tip! Over time, how can a wing NOT snap off?! Example 2: the Airbus 300-600 that AMR crashed @ JFK has a honeycomb composite rudder with no spar in it. This failed on this Airbus aircraft.
In summary:
The pendulum of commercial aircraft design has swung way past the point of prudent/safe design. The momentum for this swing is found in the fact that "bean counters" and "bottom liners", backed by political forces (read the greens, et.al.), have high-jacked the construction and certification process of our commercial fleets to the point of producing unsafe passenger transports.
I predict that each succeeding accident will be blamed on "Pilot Error" like the poor AMR JFK crash; "Act of God/NATURE"-US Air Hudson; "Weather-Related"-Air France.
I support the premise that the causal/contributing factors these officials found are but a deflection from the true cause: too much under/flimsy/composite construction and inadequate pilot input and override ability to these automated systems.
Respectfully, Old School Pilot
From Chet, M.I.T. 1941 graduate, and aeronautical engineer extraordinaire. This was forwarded to him from the former chairman of the M.I.T. Aeronautical Engineering Department. I don't look at Airbus products as completely unsafe, but concur with this assessment, that Airbus has flaws in its design philosophy that degrade its products.
Subject: Airbus vs. Boeing
Interesting article from this old pilot.
Air Bus vs. Boeing
I have had several emails asking my opinion about the Air France crash and before that , the US Airways Hudson River crash.
As most of you know, I have flown the AB330-300 in Intl ops for several thousand hrs as well as , like most of you, multi thousands in Boeings. For the record, my Boeing
is in:707,727 100,200; 737-200,300,400; 747-100,200,SP; 757,767. I also have lots of Douglas (6 types)and Lockheed(2 types), Convair (2 types),Lear(2 types).
With all that, here's what I see through my "caveman" point of view:
Airbus philosophy has left the art of flying and therefore the pilot out of the loop. They train and design the operation so that any low experienced/low skilled person who is good at rote memory (read third world/read and do) pilot can get into this plane and, with enough repetition and rehearsal, fly a normal trip.
FATAL FLAW NO.1- The engines are FADEC (read computer/electronically) controlled and the flight controls are fly by wire/radio signal. THERE IS NO DIRECT CONTROL FROM THE PILOT TO THESE CRITICAL SYSTEMS. Following this spirit/philosophy, the pilot training strictly emphasizes "Always to be in the automated mode." - read auto throttles and auto pilot in all operations even including a single engine failure approach and single engine missed approach!-i.e. AUTO FLT; ALL THE TIME.
Nowhere is there any contingency training or flight manual information data for a pilot to take over manually and fly attitude and power settings for a certain configuration in the event that these auto systems fail. NOR are there any MANUAL direct link controls to the engines/flight controls from the cockpit.
FEDEC is auto control , all the time. If the Hudson River plane had allowed the pilot to override the auto throttles, could the pilots have produced some thrust? In the Boeings, you can "firewall" the engines until they melt or rip off the wing!
In every other plane I have flown in the past 40 years, there is a section in the flight ops manual that relates to this. Mainly it is a table that gives engine thrust settings and aircraft pitch settings for different speeds/configurations in the event that the pilot's airspeed indication in not reliable.- ref: Air France
FATAL FLAW #2- Airbus has incorporated composite materials into critical structural components in order to "one up" the competition with the "BEAN COUNTERS MISSION" of becoming a lighter plane with less fuel burn. Example 1: The AB 330 has no wing spar from the point where the engine mounts to the wing all the way to the wing tip! Over time, how can a wing NOT snap off?! Example 2: the Airbus 300-600 that AMR crashed @ JFK has a honeycomb composite rudder with no spar in it. This failed on this Airbus aircraft.
In summary:
The pendulum of commercial aircraft design has swung way past the point of prudent/safe design. The momentum for this swing is found in the fact that "bean counters" and "bottom liners", backed by political forces (read the greens, et.al.), have high-jacked the construction and certification process of our commercial fleets to the point of producing unsafe passenger transports.
I predict that each succeeding accident will be blamed on "Pilot Error" like the poor AMR JFK crash; "Act of God/NATURE"-US Air Hudson; "Weather-Related"-Air France.
I support the premise that the causal/contributing factors these officials found are but a deflection from the true cause: too much under/flimsy/composite construction and inadequate pilot input and override ability to these automated systems.
Respectfully, Old School Pilot
